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“Dreaming While Awake”: The Evolution of the Concept of 
Hallucination in the Nineteenth Century 
 
Shane McCorristine, University College Dublin1 
 
The dialectic of the Enlightenment radically redefined the interpretation and meaning of 
ghost-seeing by relocating the place of the ghost from the external, objective, and 
theologically structured world of experience to the internal, subjective, and 
psychologically haunted world of expression. This development led to the normalisation 
of hallucinations in psychological terms and the establishment of the idea that ghosts 
were created in the mind of the ghost-seer and were neither symptoms of psychiatric 
degeneration nor purely objective external apparitions that others could necessarily 
experience. From about the middle of the eighteenth century the figure of the ghost was 
therefore considered nothing more than a fallacious perception which impinged upon 
the conscious mind and tricked the experiencing subject into authentically seeing 
something that was not really there (Sarbin and Juhasz 348).  
Yet with the eviction of the ghost from the objective world, the spectral world 
was now held to originate chiefly within the mind of the ghost-seer; this reorientation 
and displacement inaugurated a general transformation of the critical literature on the 
supernatural in the early-nineteenth century which began to focus on the 
phenomenological perspective of the subject in order to reveal the fallacies of mental 
life and the dangers and irrationality of ghost-belief. The pedagogical underpinnings of 
this new hallucination discourse were in tune with enlightenment scepticism and a 
general contempt for the credulity and superstition present in all orders of society. Yet 
with the new habitation of ghosts, spectres, and spirits firmly within the mind of the 
percipient, the realm of psychological space itself became a deeply haunted, uncanny, 
and unhomely site (Castle; Srdjan). It is within this context that rationalist and sceptical 
arguments against the reality of the spectral world came to demonstrate the mutability 
of normal consciousness and the potential for the fluidity of psychical forms to 
constitute the content of so-called supernatural phenomena. The belief that percipients, 
those who reported experiencing visual hallucinations, were in fact “dreaming while 
                                                 
1 I would like to acknowledge the support and funding provided by the ‘Humanities Institute of Ireland 
Doctoral Scholarship’. I would also like to extend my thanks to the editors and readers at Forum. 
awake” thus became an established tenet within the new psychological theories of 
hallucinations. 
            As Theodore Sarbin wrote, when we ask the question “What is a hallucination?” 
we must remember that a hallucination is primarily an imagining that is publicly 
reported, and as such, any definition implicitly relies upon the culturally conditioned 
ideology of diagnosticians (Sarbin 363). In the nineteenth century a gradual redefinition 
takes place of what it means to see something that is not really there, as a critical 
transition takes place which removes most of the developed socio-cultural signifiers of 
ghosts which had been widespread since the early modern period. In the new sceptical 
and rationalist environment hallucinations were considered nothing more than fallacious 
perceptions - “wanderings of the mind”2 - capable of sustained psychological inquiry 
and public dissemination. This paper will show that the rationalist theory of “spectral 
illusions” which discounted the objective reality of ghost-seeing, was challenged during 
the rise of the spiritualist faith, which drew a huge amount of attention from the 
scientific and artistic community to the psychogenesis of hallucinations and the rich 
research possibilities to be found in studying the fallacies of perception. Coming in the 
wake of the establishment of spiritualism, it will be seen that the Society for Psychical 
Research proposed that a certain number of hallucinations were “veridical” in that they 
corresponded to a real and verifiable event in the world - such as the death of a loved 
one - and could be apprehended telepathically. Thus, hallucinations represent a key 
concept in nineteenth-century debates surrounding notions of psychological truth, 
spiritual revelation, and the vagaries of the human imagination. 
 
I 
In 1799, a Prussian bookseller of sceptical disposition named Christoph Friedrich 
Nicolai read a paper to the Royal Society of Berlin entitled “A Memoir on the 
Appearance of Spectres or Phantoms occasioned by Disease,” which attained cult status 
as a paradigmatic case throughout the psychological literature of the nineteenth century 
following its translation into English in 1803. In it Nicolai described how one morning 
in February 1791, during a period of considerable stress and melancholy in his personal 
                                                 
2 “Hallucination,” the anglicised form of the Latin allucinatio, meaning a wandering of the mind, made its 
first appearance in English in the 1572 translation of Lavater’s De Spectris, Lemuribus et Magnis Atque 
Insolitis Fragoribus. Here hallucinations were defined as “ghostes and spirites walking by nyght, and 
strange noyses, crackes, and sundry forwarnynges, whiche commonly happen before the death of menne, 
great slaughters and alterations of Kyngdomes” (Sarbin and Juhasz 345). 
life, he saw the apparition of a deceased person in the presence of his wife, who, 
however, reported seeing nothing. This apparition haunted him for the duration of the 
day, and in subsequent weeks the number of these figures began to increase. However 
Nicolai resolved to use his powers of observation coolly to study the phenomena and 
attempt to trace its cause.  
I observed these phenomena with great accuracy, and very often reflected on my previous 
thoughts, with a view to discover some law in the association of ideas, by which exactly these or 
other figures might present themselves to the imagination. (“A Memoir” 167) 
When the apparitions began to speak to him, Nicolai resolved to allow himself to be 
bled by his physician and leeches were applied to the anus. Almost immediately Nicolai 
began to note the acute link between his physiological condition and the spectacle of 
phantoms which haunted his sensual world: his awareness of the apparitions swarming 
around him in the surgical room gradually disappeared and by the afternoon of his 
bleeding the ghostly figures seemed to move more and more slowly, then became paler, 
and had finally dissolved into the air by the evening. Ruminating upon this very graphic 
illustration of the connection between bodily dis-equilibrium and the appearance of 
spectres in the visual sphere, Nicolai described it as a lesson for philosophers and 
sceptics to be both more credulous of accounts ghost-seeing and at the same time less 
credulous of such phenomena which show  
how far the human imagination can go in the external representation of pictures; it may also 
admonish those well-disposed persons not to ascribe to their visions any degree of reality, and 
still less to consider the effects of a disordered system, as proofs that they are haunted by spirits. 
(“A Memoir” 173) 
 
To admit to the reality of apparitions would be considered rank superstition 
among the educated classes, yet to deny totally the veracity of testimony and accuracy 
of the senses would be “the utmost tyranny of prejudice” (Ferriar 137). The notion of 
dreaming while awake, of misunderstanding the reality of the physiological and 
psychological signs presented to the mind, was a way of negotiating through the sense 
of uncanny dislocation triggered by the vision of an apparition. The belief that ghosts 
are the “stuff of dreams” and that the spectral world is a naturalistic consequence of the 
dream-world recurs in the writings on hallucinations by medical philosophers, 
scientists, alienists, psychical researchers, psychologists, and indeed poets throughout 
the nineteenth century. The notion of dreaming while awake provided an apparatus 
whereby extraordinary human testimony could be accepted by inquirers as valid and 
“veridical,” yet, notwithstanding, be also considered objectively false. Known 
throughout the nineteenth century as a prototypical “waking dreamer”3 it was within the 
context of the new hallucination discourse that Samuel Taylor Coleridge famously 
remarked that he did not believe in ghosts because he had “seen too many of them” 
(Ford 92). 
The two most influential studies upon the nature and origin of visual 
hallucinations in the early nineteenth century centred their examination on the 
phenomenon of apparitions and phantasms of the dead. In these works John Ferriar and 
Samuel Hibbert, both British medical physicians, outlined the theory of spectral 
illusions - that apparitions were to be traced to disorders and diseases of the human 
body, rather than insanity, revelation, or supernatural haunting. In An Essay Towards a 
Theory of Apparitions (1813), John Ferriar, basing his theory on the optical paradigm, 
wrote that apparitions could be explained by a “renewal of external impressions” 
through which a retinal memory could be reanimated via the visual sense (Ferriar 21). 
Samuel Hibbert in Sketches of the Philosophy of Apparitions (1825) outlined the similar 
thesis that “apparitions are nothing more than ideas, or the recollected images of the 
mind, which have been rendered more vivid than actual impressions” (Hibbert v). It is 
clear that these pioneering physiological theories of visual hallucinations formed the 
basis for psychological theories based on the similarities between the phantasmagoric 
nature of the dream world and the ghost-seeing experience, for by withdrawing the 
origins of ghosts from the supernatural world these theories laid responsibility for such 
marvels on the occult workings of the human mind: the only distinction became whether 
these perceptions had a central or peripheral origin in the brain.4   
The positivistic and campaigning anti-occultist nature of the spectral illusions 
discourse is directly linked to the case of Nicolai, yet it also represents a broader 
intellectual shift that led to the psychologisation of supernatural perceptions in the sane. 
Of primary importance in this transformation was the phantasmagoric legacy of 
                                                 
3 Patricia Adair entitles her study of Coleridge The Waking Dream (1967), yet this labelling was also 
current within Victorian psychology and criticism (Carpenter 268). 
4 Yet preliminary remarks upon the assured religious beliefs of the author were common among the anti-
apparition philosophers who were keen to annul any charges of atheism or materialism brought against 
them. Ferriar’s disclaimer read: “observe, however, that the following treatise is applicable, in its 
principles, to profane history, and to the delusions of individuals only. If any thing contained in the 
ensuing pages could be construed into the most indirect reference to theological discussions, the 
manuscript would have been committed, without mercy, to the flames” (Ferriar ix). On the debate over 
the origin of hallucinations, central or peripheral, see Gurney 1885, 168-171, and Parish 110-151. 
enlightened researches into the human faculties, which necessitated that the supernatural 
experience would be interpreted and re-imagined through the metaphor of dreams and 
dreaming. Yet as this development led to deeper investigations into the workings of the 
mind, waking and sleeping, new difficulties and categories emerged demanding an 
increased nosological awareness and new systems of symptomatolgy to create 
coherence in the structuring of perceptual experience. 
Thus, in 1832 the French alienist J.E.D. Esquirol strengthened the medical 
model of ghost-seeing with his celebrated definition of hallucinations:  
In Hallucinations everything happens in the brain (mind). The visionaries, the ecstatics, are 
people who suffer from hallucinations, dreamers while they are awake. The activity of the brain 
is so energetic that the visionary, the person hallucinating, ascribes a body and an actuality to 
images that the memory recalls without the intervention of senses. (qtd. in Flint 263) 
Therefore hallucinations, as fallacious perceptions with no actual external percept to 
excite the mind, became part of the continuum of altered states of consciousness 
ranging from a harmless poetic reverie to somnambulistic visions where the subject 
projected the ideas and images of the memory and gave form to his imagination in real 
life, thus dreaming while fully awake. In his much cited study, Des Hallucinations, ou 
Histoire Raisonnée des Apparitions, des Visions, des Songes, de l'Extase, du 
Magnétisme et du Somnambulisme (1845, translated 1859), A. Brierre de Boismont, 
who had worked within Esquirol’s circle, departed from his teacher’s pathological 
theory of hallucinations and instead emphasised the normality of hallucinations and 
their co-existence with sanity, regarding them as consistent with the due exercise of 
reason - an interpretation which allowed for the retrospective diagnosis of sanity upon 
many major historical figures who reported hallucinations (377).5 
This notion of waking-dreams represented the blind side of a rationalist 
psychology which had aimed at bringing the workings of the mind and the soul to the 
light of reason and understanding, for more and more commentators were writing about 
the essential hallucinatory nature of thinking experience in itself. In his book De 
l’Intelligence (1870), Hippolyte Taine urged that we be constantly aware of the 
“invincible” illusions, tricks, and falsehoods of human consciousness. Like an eye with 
poor visual capabilities, Taine argued that consciousness must be magnified and en-
                                                 
5 The writings of William W. Ireland in particular pioneered the application of psychological concepts 
such as hallucination to historical figures. In The Blot Upon the Brain: Studies in History and Psychology 
(1885), and its sequel, Through the Ivory Gate: Studies in Psychology and History (1889), Ireland studied 
the hallucinations of figures such as Joan of Arc, Martin Luther, King Ludwig II of Bavaria, Emmanuel 
Swedenborg, and William Blake.  
lightened in order to make proper sense of the external world (Taine x). He particularly 
focused on the vagaries of sensation in his study and argued that in a hallucination 
situation the “special reductive” in the mind, that which contradicts and corrects the 
erroneous sensation, fails in its duty, allowing the brain to sense what is not actually 
there:  
That is why solitude, silence, obscurity, the want of attention, all circumstances, in short which 
suppress or diminish the corrective sensation, facilitate or provoke the hallucination; and 
reciprocally, company, light, conversation, aroused attention, all circumstances giving rise to, or 
augmenting, the corrective sensation, destroy or weaken the hallucination. (Taine 54) 
Thus Taine particularly singled out Nicolai’s strength of mind, praising his method of 
rectification and the acknowledgment that he was in fact physiologically ill and that the 
phantoms surrounding him were merely dreamlike illusions not to be addressed or given 
supernatural significance. Yet in his study Taine came to the conclusion that the human 
mind is dominated by images, representations, and ideas that have no external present 
reality, but are processed as if they do. Therefore Taine felt justified in characterising 
the hallucination as the basic fact of mental life, and the state of mind of a healthy 
percipient as a series of hallucinations which halt at a certain point, the inability of this 
halting mechanism characterising more morbid states of mind: Taine followed 
Boismont in refusing to label hallucinations as general pathological symptoms. Thus 
“external perception is an internal dream which proves to be in harmony with external 
things: an instead of calling a hallucination a false external perception, we must call 
external perception a true hallucination” (Taine 224). 
 
II 
In a classic Enlightenment essay from 1766, Immanuel Kant, newly awakened from his 
dogmatic slumbers by David Hume, had noted that the illusions of metaphysics 
resemble the dreamlike cogitations of spiritualist mystics to an almost uncanny degree. 
His Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (Dreams of a 
Spirit-seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics) was published anonymously and was 
ostensibly presented as a sceptical examination of the mystical theories of Emmanuel 
Swedenborg whom he considers “the arch-spirit-seer of all spirit-seers” solely to please 
Kant’s friends who urged the essay, and to provide some justification for going to the 
trouble of purchasing Swedenborg’s main work Arcana Celestia (1749-56), which he 
considered to be “stuffed full of nonsense” (341, 347). However, this tactic of sarcasm 
and nonchalance merely served to accentuate further the disturbance Kant felt at the 
revelations of “Schwedenberg” (purposefully spelt wrongly by Kant) and indeed the 
nature and meaning of hallucinations. 
Kant believed that the differences between the metaphysical dreamer (a dreamer 
of reason), such as himself, and a Geisterseher (a dreamer of sense) such as 
Swedenborg, were based upon the will-to-deception of the ghost-seer who transposes 
the figments of his imagination, the focus imaginarius, outside of himself and into the 
external world. Such a conjuration or “deception” Kant believed was an effect of 
madness, or an inability of the will to exert its concentrative power. The introduction of 
the phenomenon of the “will” in the psychical process of seeing hallucinations was 
extremely problematised by the spread of mesmerism and induced somnambulism in 
western Europe in the early part of the nineteenth century where practitioners claiming 
pseudo-scientific powers could apparently induce a wakeful sleep in the patient 
(Crabtree; Ellenberger). With the phenomenon of magnetic sleep naturalised as 
hypnotism by James Braid in the 1840s, experimental psychologists demonstrated that 
visual, aural, and tactile hallucinations could be induced through suggestion and pointed 
to the potential of magnetic sleep to reveal the latent content of the subliminal mind and 
its dreams, a development which led directly to Freudian psychoanalysis via Jean-
Martin Charcot’s treatment of hysterics in the 1870s and 1880s.    
Different arguments about the nature of the will emerged in the philosophy of 
Arthur Schopenhauer who believed that paranormal phenomena such as ghost-seeing 
proved the nature of his philosophical system. In his “Über das Geistersehn” (“Essay on 
Spirit Seeing”) (1851), Schopenhauer argued that the palpable reality and affects of the 
dream upon the mind of the sleeper would prove that an intuitive perception of the 
world is possible without the actual presence of real bodies. The dream is considered the 
second faculty of intuitive perception, after empirical perception, and Schopenhauer 
assigns to the process of sleeping and dreaming acute responsibilities for the welfare 
and maintenance of the body, for visions are in a waking state what prophetic dreams 
are in a sleeping state, phenomena most frequently pertaining to the welfare of the 
individual. Ghost-seers merely objectively perceive the world through a “dream organ” 
with which they actively “dream the real” (Wahrträumen): thus apparitions of the 
living, the dead, and the dying may be objectively seen in the same way as they are in a 
fantastical dream, for much like people in a trance who are preternaturally aware of 
everything around them, the ghost-seers’ internal intuitive perception has superseded 
the pull of the external senses and thus clairvoyance is an enhancement of the dreaming 
of the real. Schopenhauer believed that cases of ghost-seeing and second-sight were 
indicative of the world-as-will, that is, that the conceptual “Will” which he claimed to 
underlie reality was capable of transmitting warnings, premonitions, and supernatural 
awareness among human minds (Schopenhauer 268). 
With spiritualism becoming a matter of great controversy in the English 
scientific community the 1850s, the hallucination discourse became inextricably linked 
with what was generically described as the “epidemic hysteria” and “latent insanity” of 
séance room perceptions. However, the calibre and respectability of scientific observers 
such as Alfred Russell Wallace and William Crookes who were reporting paranormal 
experiences and enthusiastically converting to spiritualism, forced late-Victorian mental 
physiologists to focus upon the hidden workings of the normal mind which seemed to 
betray the intelligence and common-sense of otherwise normal people (Palfreman). For 
the celebrated mental physiologist William Carpenter, it was all a question of will as he 
demonstrated how supernatural sensations could be automatically produced by mental 
states characteristic of “expectant attention,” or acute lack of volition, which allowed 
beliefs to be experienced as true sensations - phenomenological facts with no actual 
basis in reality. Following the naturalisation of many facets of the spiritualist repertoire 
such as mesmerism, table-turning, and thought-reading, the seeing and hearing of 
deceased figures became characterised as a willing hallucination, yet one in which 
“unconscious cerebration,” or the subliminal mind, was active in perverting reality, thus 
deeply disturbing an empirical epistemology based upon evidence and personal 
testimony. Carpenter believed that spiritualists could truly see the content of their own 
unconscious and attributed this to a resignation of the faculty of “Common Sense” 
(Carpenter 115). Continuing the theory of spectral illusions, Carpenter radically 
devalued the evidence of the senses, propounding the point that sensations can be 
produced by mental states: indeed the “Sensorium” emerges as a contested perceptual 
engine at the mercy of all types of sensation with little distinction between perceptions 
that are “real” or “fictive.” People who attend spiritualistic séances are “possessed” with 
ideas, and in their state of “expectant attention” “it is comfortable to all scientific 
probability that they should see luminous manifestations, should smell flowers, should 
feel the contact of spirit-hands or the voices of departed friends.” (Carpenter 165) 
Much like Coleridge before him, Carpenter used the symptom of “suspension of 
volitional control” to draw attention to the continuity between the variety of phenomena 
and states of mind which share this major feature. Thus, in Carpenter’s system, 
dreaming, delirium, hypnotism, reverie, abstraction, ghost-seeing, and indeed, insanity, 
were all essentially symptomatic of a lack of will-power within the mind of the 
percipient (Carpenter 557, 584). A battleground thus emerges in the hallucination 
discourse between multiple psychological realities vying to prove the evidential basis of 
their sense impressions. It is within this field that we may locate theories of 
evolutionary psychological mechanisms such as Sigmund Freud’s analysis of the 
emergence of the reality principle as a response to the failure of the hallucination to 
satisfy the desiring individual. On a similar note, Francis Galton believed that the 
natural hallucinatory world of the individual was socially repressed and liable to be 
unearthed only in epistemic shift in late-Victorian society whereby a high cultural value 
would be placed on reported hallucination cases; this was a scenario which did in fact 
emerge towards the end of the century in a variety of cultural fields from psychical 
research to pre-surrealist aesthetics. Indeed in the pioneering anthropology of Edward 
Tylor in the 1870s the very basis of the animistic belief in the soul, and thus the origins 
of religion, was traced back to the hallucinatory perception of reality contained in the 
dream-world where the personality of the dreamer appeared to exist in an otherworld 
where life and death, and where reality and fantasy, were no longer contradictions. 
Commentators were thus appreciating notions of reality as more a continuum of varying 
levels of conscious and unconscious perception than as a monolithic concept.  
 
III 
In this context, the nineteenth century developed a democratic and widespread market 
for tales of ghost-seeing and hallucination which shirked off compartmentalisation into 
a single discourse, entertainment network, or episteme. Ghost stories, whether told 
around a fire at Christmas time, conceived in the imagination of scores of the most 
accomplished Victorian and Edwardian writers, or collected and collated in 
psychological and psychical journals, exerted a huge influence upon mid- to late-
nineteenth-century fields of debate centred upon the reality of the sensual world and the 
extent to which scientific epistemology could accurately interpret the phenomenological 
reality reported by percipients throughout Britain. As the boundaries between notions of 
normality and abnormality became more fluid and transient, even within the unitary 
personality, it was clear that the metaphorics of the dream world could function as an 
ambiguous labelling procedure whereby hallucinations were possible, normal, and a 
rich source of aesthetic inspiration and wonder.  
“A Christmas Carol” by Charles Dickens, first published in 1843, can serve as a 
fictional representation of the many debates and issues regarding the vagaries of human 
perception in the hallucination discourse, as mentioned above. Taine had gone so far as 
to ascribe to external objective perception the metaphor of hallucination, a situation in 
which the world itself becomes a phantasmagorical dream, further breaking down 
notions of outside and inside, and the boundaries between the occult machinery of 
consciousness and the film of traceable reality. In his supernatural fiction, Dickens 
interrogates the dissonance experienced by the ghost-seer at the uncertainty of knowing 
whether the senses are to be trusted in their interpretation of reality. Scrooge’s 
supernatural experiences begin innocently enough, with what would have been termed 
by contemporaries an “illusion.” Letting himself in home at night Scrooge “saw in the 
knocker, without its undergoing any intermediate process of change - not a knocker, but 
Marley’s face” (Dickens 14). This illusion, a mistaken perception of real objects in the 
visual field, vanishes rapidly yet forms a psychological gateway to the more serious 
hallucinations that will afflict Scrooge later on in the story.6  
 Throughout his ghost-seeing experiences Scrooge seems to demonstrate an 
awareness of the spectral illusions theory of hallucinations. Repeating the mantra of 
“humbug” he remains steadily incredulous in the face of the sensory data before him: 
“You don’t believe in me”, observed the ghost. “I don’t”, said Scrooge. “What evidence would 
you have of my reality beyond that of your own senses?” “I don’t know”, said Scrooge. “Why do 
you doubt your senses?” “Because”, said Scrooge, “a little thing affects them. A slight disorder 
of the stomach makes them cheats. You may be an undigested bit of beef, a blot of mustard, a 
crumb of cheese, a fragment of an underdone potato. There’s more of gravy than of grave about 
you, whatever you are!” (Dickens 18) 
Stating this in spite of the obvious sensual reality of the spectre, Scrooge resembles the 
heroes of the spectral illusion discourse, percipients who, like Nicolai, fought against 
their senses and refused to ascribe reality to objects they were sure had a physiological 
origin. The remainder of the tale can be read as a spectre-show in which the appearance 
of so many apparitions bombards and literally frightens Scrooge into a belief in the 
                                                 
6 As Edmund Gurney wrote: “Illusions, or false perceptions of colour, often precede the appearance of 
more distinct phantasms. So, in cases of more transient abnormality - such as the well-known illusions 
hypnagogiques - other signs precede the hallucination. The observer, whose eyes are heavy with sleep, 
begins by seeing luminous points and streaks, which shift and change in remarkable ways; and it is from 
these as nuclei that the subsequent pictures develop” (Gurney 1885, 181-182). 
reality of the spiritual world and a consequent entrance into a “community of 
sensation”7 whose members, like Scrooge’s nephew, exhibit Christian charity and 
compassion in their daily lives. In this development the space of the bedroom, where 
falling asleep, dreaming, and waking take place, is crucial in signifying the potential for 
the detailed waking-dreams. It is here that Scrooge wonders about the reality of his 
hallucinations and frets over the uncertainty as to whether they belong in the dream-
world or the world of reality:  
every time he resolved within himself, after mature enquiry, that it was all a dream, his mind 
flew back again, like a strong spring released, to its first position, and presented the same 
problem to be worked all through, “Was it a dream or not?” (Dickens 24-25) 
Scrooge is visited by the ghosts of Christmas past, present, and future while in his bed 
(indeed the Ghost of Christmas future becomes a bedpost as he departs), and the 
inability to distinguish his experiences from waking dreams is complicated by the fact 
that he is described as being “much in need of repose” and “being exhausted, and 
overcome by an irresistible drowsiness” (Dickens 23, 39). The ghost-seeing described in 
“A Christmas Carol” can be considered as part of the contemporary hallucination 
discourse which noted the extreme mutability of consciousness and the inability to tell 
real objects from the externalised representations of the mind that dreams while awake.  
The Society for Psychical Research (SPR), founded by Cambridge intellectuals 
and spiritualists in 1882, proved a central component in late-century debates concerning 
the veridicality of hallucinations, dealing with cases that seemed to have the 
forcefulness and realism of Dickens’s fictional tale. In their efforts to locate ghost-
seeing within the mainstream of scientific naturalism, the SPR propounded a telepathic 
theory of apparitions in which the hallucination of the living person could appear to a 
percipient as an apparition. Building upon their belief in the veridical nature of 
telepathic apparitions, the SPR began to use the term “phantasm” to refer to a 
hallucination of the sense of sight caused by an unusual condition in a distant agent: 
In virtue of having their real cause outside the percipient, and so in a way conveying true 
information, we may describe death-wraiths and the like as veridical hallucinations; but as 
projections of the percipient’s own mind, by which his senses are deluded, we hold them to be 
altogether on a par with morbid hallucinations. (Barrett et al. 168) 
                                                 
77 This, and similar, phrases frequently occurred in Victorian writings on mesmerism and hypnotism to 
express the metaphor of intimate contact between people at a distance from each other (Barrett et al., 
1883, 224). 
Thus, by describing them as mental phenomena with no physical reality, by dealing 
with a person who was dying, that is, still technically alive, and by linking the topic to 
what they believed was scientifically proven - telepathy - the SPR sought to modernise 
the ghost story as an empirical narrative within the precepts of scientific naturalism. The 
classic representation of this exploration remains Phantasms of the Living (1886). 
However, in defining a phantasm as a hallucination of the sense of sight caused by an 
unusual condition or crisis, usually death, in a distant agent - usually a loved one - the 
SPR were having their cake and eating it, for they were using the physiological 
consensus on hallucinations to posit a new perceptible region in the unconscious mind 
which activated the mechanism of hallucination. Reacting to criticism of their methods 
of collecting data, the SPR resolved to back up their telepathic theory with a 
sociological survey that proved unique in late-Victorian psychology and was only 
approached in ambition by a similar Mass Observation study in 1947 (West).  
Organising a “Census of Hallucinations”, the SPR asked the question:  
Have you ever, when believing yourself to be completely awake, had a vivid impression of 
seeing, or being touched by a living being or inanimate object, or of hearing a voice; which 
impression, so far as you could discover, was not due to any external physical cause? (Sidgwick 
et al. 33) 
After receiving 17,000 answers by 1894, the publication of this report led to the claim 
that about 10% of the population have experienced an hallucination, usually visual or 
auditory, while in a conscious and wakeful state (Sidgwick et al. 39). However the most 
sustained criticism of the Census centred on the difficulties of separating the realms of 
dream and reality in the mind of the average respondent. The fact that a significant 
number of hallucinations (especially the cases considered by the SPR indicative of 
veridical hallucinations) occurred while the percipient was in bed or in a bedroom led 
some critics to suggest that the boundary between believing one is awake and actually 
being in a sleepy or dreamy state were not as clear to define as some psychical 
researchers would like. Just as dreams sometimes took their place as real memories in 
the mind of the wakeful person, so hallucinations during sleep could become 
indistinguishable from real events in the perceptual world. The German psychologist 
Edmund Parish pointed to a fundamental dissociation of consciousness in sane people 
who during hallucination-experiences misinterpret a significant amount of the time 
when they were not fully awake. He wrote:  
The frequent recital of an interesting occurrence tends to imprint a distinct picture of it on the 
mind, and the vividness of the mental image serves further to confirm the percipient’s conviction 
of having been fully awake at the time - a delusion common with persons in a drowsy, half-
asleep condition. It is not, then, much to be wondered at if gradually all subsidiary detail fades 
away, until finally there remains in the memory only two points of cardinal importance - the 
hallucination itself, and the conviction of having been fully awake. (Parish 106) 
This theory of dream ghost-seeing was also noted, from another angle, by the psychical 
researcher Frederic Myers who, in order to explain the apparent lack of volition and the 
meaningless actions of many reported apparitions wrote: “The projection of the 
phantom, if I may so term it, seems a matter wholly automatic on the agent’s part, as 
automatic and meaningless as a dream” (Myers 196).  
Recent cultural studies have highlighted the links between the development of 
the new psychology of the late-nineteenth century and the emergence of artistic 
modernism (Micale). What cannot be overlooked is the blending of the cultural fields of 
fictional supernatural writing with the psychological investigation of hallucinations. A 
prime example of this would be the interplay between the brothers Henry and William 
James, one a modernist, the other a psychologist and psychical researcher - and the 
almost endless scholarship on Henry James’s “The Turn of the Screw” has 
comprehensively dealt with the literary influence of the SPR hallucination discourse 
upon this text (Roellinger). From an avant-garde perspective, citing the “gothic 
psychiatry” of Frederic Myers, the French surrealist André Breton wrote about how the 
engagement between psychical research and automatism, and the relationship between 
hallucination and creativity, inspired the trajectory of the surrealist movement, 
dominated as it was by Rimbaud’s injunction that one must “make oneself a seer” 
through a “disordering of the senses” (Breton et al. 17). Indeed, the whole progress of 
surrealism can be examined as a sustained effort to simulate a variety of abnormal 
conditions in order to reveal the dreamlike nature of external reality, and in Odilon 
Redon’s phrase, put “the logic of the visible at the service of the invisible” (qtd. in Flint 
262).  
The metaphor of wakeful dreaming formed a conceptual scaffold with which the 
major ghost-seeing theory of the early- to mid-nineteenth-century presented its findings 
to the reading public. From 1800-1840, the theory of spectral illusions, inspired by the 
case of Nicolai, attempted to redefine the phenomenology of everyday life by 
suggesting a dramatic psychological connectedness and slippage between the spheres of 
dream and reality. The notion that ghost-seeing was nothing more than a dream 
appeared as a disguisedly simple doctrine, yet it nevertheless functioned as a rich 
semantic mediation describing the deceptions and impostures of mental life. As such, 
the standardisation of this conceptual metaphor played a central role in the strength of 
the psychological paradigm within the hallucination discourses, as seen in the criticisms 
of the accounts of spiritualistic séances and the findings of the SPR’s “Census of 
Hallucinations” by the scientific establishment. Using the cultural fascination with the 
production of dreams and sense of psychological uncertainty surrounding the dream-
world to deny the objective reality of supernatural apparitions, the concept that people 
can dream while they are awake also problematised the medical belief that the 
hallucination is a pathological symptom. What this survey shows is that the notion of 
dreaming while awake may link supernatural beliefs with psychological discourse in a 
way that is mediated by the emerging psychologies of the unconscious, and as such this 
idea constitutes one of the most interesting mythopoetic impulses behind the emergence 
of modernity.  
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